

# ANTI-CORRUPTION RESEARCH NEWS

## KNOWLEDGE FOR TRANSPARENCY - LINKING ANTI-CORRUPTION RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

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## ACRN: MOBILISING GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE AGAINST CORRUPTION

Welcome to the sixth issue of Anti-Corruption Research News. Here you will find recent insights and activities in anti-corruption research, synthesised for scholars, policy-makers and anti-corruption practitioners. This newsletter is part of the Anti-Corruption Research Network (ACRN), an initiative by Transparency International to build a knowledge community and information service for anti-corruption research.

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### RANDOMISED CONTROLLED TRIALS – A NEW APPROACH TO ASSESSING ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES

By Pia Raffler, Yale University\*

#### What is the best way of tackling corruption?

The best intended social policies can have no or even negative effects if large portions of the resources are syphoned off. While we seem to approach a consensus that reducing leakage, defined as both corruption and misuse of resources, is a priority in achieving social policy objectives, relatively little is known on the how. A new approach to answering questions in social policy is taking hold across the field of international development – randomised controlled trials (RCTs). Borrowed from medical trials for new drugs, RCTs are considered the most rigorous methodology available for estimating the real impact of an intervention. RCTs can help us to understand what kind of programs work best in tackling corruption.

#### Some Questions

What are the most cost effective ways of achieving transparency and accountability of basic service delivery? For example, how

can we ensure that teachers and health workers in rural areas have the right incentives to do their work? How can one warrant that funds intended to build community roads are actually used that way? More generally, how can one make sure that resources reach the intended beneficiaries without being captured by elites?

There are a wide range of possible solutions, from incentive based pay for civil servants, over community monitoring, publication of budget allocations, enhanced auditing, integrity pledges, legal reform, etc. But how do we know which intervention works best under which circumstances? How do we know which interventions are the most cost effective? How can we make sure we use the limited resources available for anti-corruption work in the most effective manner?

Randomised controlled trials are beginning to shed light on some of these questions.

### Latest from the ACRN online platform on anti-corruption research

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[www.corruptionresearchnetwork.org](http://www.corruptionresearchnetwork.org)

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## ANTI-CORRUPTION RESEARCH NEWS

### SPOTLIGHT: RANDOMISED CONTROLLED TRIALS



Photo: Alexandr Tovstenko

#### Why use RCTs to address these?

RCTs are considered the most rigorous way to assess the causal effects of an intervention. When we think about impact, we are really asking two questions: First, what would have happened in the absence of the intervention? Second, how does the situation with the intervention compare to the counterfactual? Answering the first question is non-trivial. The world we live in is complex. Many different influences take place at the same time, making it difficult to attribute any observed change to one single event.

Things get even more complicated when the uptake of a program is self-initiated. Different types of governments, communities or individuals select into different programs, making any before-after comparisons prone to bias. Say we want to know the impact of publishing budget allocations in local communities. Uptake of the program is up to the local leadership of the community. A study compares the change in the percentage of funds leaked across communities who adopted the program and those who did not. It finds that those who adopted the program significantly reduced the share of leaked funds. What can we conclude about the effectiveness of the program? Unfortunately, nothing. First, communities who adopt the program are likely to be different in the first place: They may have a more active civil society, politicians with better intentions, or have more pressure to 'clean up'. This may mean that they were on a different trend all along. It may also mean that they adopted other measures simultaneously, precisely because they had an interest in improving accountability.

RCTs allow us to get around these challenges by constructing a valid counterfactual. For example, to evaluate this program one would identify a pool of two hundred eligible communities and randomly select one hundred that will receive the program (the treatment group) and one hundred which will not (at least not at this same time – the control group). Comparing outcomes between the

treatment and control group, say two years later, allows isolating the actual impact of the program itself. Due to the randomisation, unobservable characteristics such as intrinsic motivation, activity of civil society etc. are by expectation the same across treatment and control group. General time trends, such as other government programs implemented, economic growth etc. should be the same across both groups, allowing us to control for those.

#### Some answers, and more questions

In recent years, development economists and political scientists have started addressing some of the questions around governance and accountability by measuring the impact of different interventions through randomised controlled trials. A few findings from these studies and remaining open questions are highlighted below.

The first question is whether participatory community monitoring initiatives or government audits are more effective in curbing corruption, and in which types of programs. Ben Olken's experimental work in Indonesia points to the conclusion that community monitoring can be very effective if (a) leakage is easily detectable by laypeople and (b) if the monitoring concerns the provision of private goods (such as salaries in a public works program). If, on the other hand, the monitored service provision is related to public goods (such as roads) or if leakage is hard to detect by laypeople, its effectiveness is limited. Olken's work suggests that in these circumstances independent audits are more effective.<sup>1</sup> More work is needed to explore whether these patterns hold in other contexts.

Second, what institutional arrangements for community monitoring are the most effective? Should everyone be included, in order to maximise participation, or is it more effective to include only a few elected focal people from the community in order to minimise free-riding? Alternatively, can we use modern technology to have service providers monitor themselves? For example in India, Esther

*“[I]ssues related to governance and corruption are among the hardest to study – precisely because they are so political and because the effectiveness of any intervention is highly contingent on the environment in which it is implemented and the political will behind it.”*

*Are participatory community monitoring initiatives or government audits more effective in curbing corruption? What institutional arrangements for community monitoring are the most effective?*

## SPOTLIGHT: RANDOMISED CONTROLLED TRIALS

*“In order to really learn, we need to do study corruption programs in a strategic manner. This means designing studies that allow us to disentangle the effects of different components of an intervention through crosscutting designs and that speak directly to the existing theory”*

Duflo et al. found that requesting teachers to take pictures of themselves in front of their class with a disposable camera with tamper-proof time stamps every morning and afternoon and making salary payment contingent to it dramatically reduced teacher absenteeism.<sup>2</sup>

Third, is community monitoring alone sufficient? Björkman and Svensson found the community monitoring of health service provision in rural areas in Uganda highly effective. Part of the intervention was training communities on how to act on the observation of misuse of resources, establishing fora with health service providers and politicians, etc.<sup>3</sup> A related intervention in India, community monitoring of schools, did not have any effect.<sup>4</sup> One possible explanation is that it was not paired with an intervention aimed at enabling communities to act on the information about misuse of funds. More work is needed to explore this systematically – for example by directly comparing the effectiveness of community monitoring ‘only’ with community monitoring ‘plus’, i.e. combined with an avenue to take action and exerting pressure on politicians.

Another set of open questions centers around norms: What role do changes in norms among either community members or politicians and bureaucrats play in reducing corruption? Can they be induced from the outside, for example through community awareness campaigns or integrity pledges for government officials?<sup>5</sup>

### Caveats

All methodologies have their shortcomings, and RCTs are no exception. While they are considered the gold standard for estimating the causal effects of an intervention, they only work in certain circumstances. First of all, one needs to think about evaluation before the project starts – once it is underway it is too late (this caveat really applies to any serious evaluation).

Second, the approach relies on randomisation

into treatment and control group along a sufficiently large number of units in order to establish meaningful counterfactuals. This implies that (a) it must be possible to target the intervention to a specific user group, and (b) effects must be local. For example an integrity pledge aimed at reducing corruption at the local level fits the bill. National legal reform does not meet either criterion: it targets a national legal system and expected effects are national. Neither do advocacy campaigns aimed at changing national policy making. While implementation may be localised, the expected effect occurs at the national level.

A third caveat is ethical considerations. While we can evaluate additional programs – and I would argue are ethically obliged to do so in order to ensure that limited resources are used efficiently – evaluating programs to which everyone has a basic right, such as for example investigation as response to accusations is problematic. We can always evaluate the impact of doing additional investigations, but should never take them away from anyone.

Last but not least comes external validity. Will an intervention that worked in country A also work in country B? In a sense, issues related to governance and corruption are among the hardest to study – precisely because they are so political and because the effectiveness of any intervention is highly contingent on the environment in which it is implemented and the political will behind it.

In order to really learn, we need to do study corruption programs in a strategic manner. This means designing studies that (a) allow us to disentangle the effects of different components of an intervention through crosscutting designs<sup>6</sup> and (b) that speak directly to the existing theory.<sup>7</sup> This also implies consistent replication of studies in different countries.

### References

1. B. Olken, “Monitoring corruption. Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 115: 200–49, 2007
2. E. Duflo et al., “Monitoring works. Getting Teachers to Come to School”, CEPR Discussion Paper no. DP6682, 2008
3. M. Björkman and J. Svensson, “Power to the People. Evidence from a Randomized Experiment of a Citizen Report Card Project in Uganda”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124, 2009
4. A. Banerjee et al., “Pitfalls of Participatory Programs. Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Education in India”, *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 2(1): 1–30, 2010
5. For a comprehensive review on the literature on governance and open questions see the forthcoming white paper by the JPAL governance initiative ([www.povertyactionlab.org](http://www.povertyactionlab.org)). For a forthcoming review of corruption related experiments, see L. Peisakhin, “Field Experimentation and the Study of Corruption” in S. Rose-Ackerman and T. Søreide (Eds.) *The International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption*, vol. 2 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming)
6. Crosscutting designs refer to breaking a bundled intervention up into several treatment arms. For example, if one wants to measure the impact of a program that involves community reporting on corruption and a training for communities on how to exert pressure on local government officials to reduce corruption, one would have on treatment group where the community reporting intervention is introduced, and one where both the community reporting and the trainings are introduced, in addition to the control group. This way, it is possible to measure both (a) the impact of the combined intervention, as well as (b) the impact of community reporting alone, and (c) the added benefit from implementing the training intervention in addition to the community reporting.
7. Please see C. Blattman: Impact Evaluation 2.0. Talk at DfID, 2008, on how to design useful experiments. [http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/policy/2008.ImpactEvaluation2.DFID\\_talk.pdf](http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/policy/2008.ImpactEvaluation2.DFID_talk.pdf)

## ANTI-CORRUPTION RESEARCH NEWS

### HIGHLIGHTS IN ANTI-CORRUPTION RESEARCH

#### MEASURING CORRUPTION

##### Promoting Revenue Transparency: 2011 Report on Oil and Gas Companies

Transparency International and the Revenue Watch Institute have released the second Promoting Revenue Report on Oil and Gas Companies. This expanded version of the 2008 report rates 44 companies on their levels of transparency. Representing 60 per cent of global oil and gas production, the companies are evaluated in three areas: reporting on anti-corruption programmes, organisational disclosure, and country-level disclosure of financial and technical data. Findings highlight a number of improvements in reporting and reviewing processes, whilst pointing to areas where further work needs to be done, such as making country by country reporting mandatory.

[http://www.transparency.org/news\\_room/in\\_focus/2011/prt\\_2011](http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2011/prt_2011)

##### The EU Quality of Government Index

This study, published in January 2011 by the Quality of Government Institute produces new data at the regional level for 172 NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) regions in the EU for 18 countries from a survey of 34,000 EU citizens in which respondents were asked questions on the quality, impartiality and level of corruption in three key public sector services: education, health care and law enforcement in their region. An index was generated from the survey data, and combined with several national level indicators from the World Bank Governance Indicators. The 'EU QoG Index' (EQI) is now freely available for researchers interested in investigating aspects of governance and corruption at the sub-national level within the EU.

<http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/>

##### Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries, 2000 – 2009

This report from Global Financial Integrity, published in January 2011, attempts to quantify the quantity and patterns of illicit financial flows coming out of developing countries. It finds that Illicit outflows increased from \$1.06 trillion in 2006 to approximately \$1.26 trillion in 2008, with average annual illicit outflows from developing countries averaging \$725 billion to \$810 billion, per year, over the 2000-2008 time period measured. The report also provides regional and country-level estimates of illicit flows out of developing countries.

<http://iff-update.gfip.org/>

#### UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION

##### The Ethnography of Corruption: Research Themes in Political Anthropology

Davide Torsello, 2011

This study argues that ethnographic approaches, although relatively new and applied fairly sporadically by the research community, can provide concrete and innovative answers to the study of corruption, particularly in its socio-political and cultural manifestations. The approach provides an important shift away from traditional analysis, shifting the focus to behaviour and practices that accompany the spread of corruption.

[http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/working\\_papers/2011\\_2\\_Torsello.pdf](http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/working_papers/2011_2_Torsello.pdf)

##### Corruption: Greed, Culture and the State

Susan Rose-Ackerman, 2010

This article unpacks free-market libertarian and cultural ethnographic perspectives and suggests that when applied to corruption, each approach invokes aspects traditionally associated with the other. The author points out that corporate interests, which in other circumstances emphasize the value of the free market, characteristically invoke local cultural practices as an excuse for engaging in corruption. On the other hand, scholars of local cultural practices invoke economic incentives and the profit motive of multinational firms to condemn grand corruption. The article also introduces the author's "democratic legitimacy" approach which highlights the need to strengthen state capacity and accountability.

[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1648859](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1648859)

##### What Accountability Pressures Do MPs in Africa Face and How Do They Respond? Evidence from Ghana

Staffan I. Lindberg, 2010

This article looks at the role of strong institutions and clientelism among parliamentarians in Ghana. The author challenges the current theoretical models which propose that clientelism only thrives if there are weak political institutions. He finds that political clientelism can also be prevalent when institutions are strong, just in ways that favour the provision of private goods. Another interesting insight from the study is the role played by informal accountability mechanisms, such as clan or familial loyalty, under a clientelistic systems.

[http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/sil/downloads/Lindberg10\\_MPsinGhana.pdf](http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/sil/downloads/Lindberg10_MPsinGhana.pdf)



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*“Illicit flows increased in current dollar terms by 18.0 percent per annum from \$369.3 billion at the start of the decade to \$1.26 trillion in 2008.”*

Global Financial Integrity, 2011

*“One striking feature of the booming literature on corruption in the social sciences is the comparatively weak role played by anthropology. A recent World Bank review notices that anthropological studies dealing with corruption cover about 2% of the relevant scientific literature.”*

Davide Torsello, 2011

## HIGHLIGHTS IN ANTI-CORRUPTION RESEARCH

*A recent field experiment on access to ration cards among New Delhi's slum dwellers demonstrate that India's recently adopted freedom of information law is almost as effective as bribery in helping the poor to secure access to a basic public service.*

Leonid Peisakhin and Paul Pinto, 2010

*"[I]f donors really want to reduce corruption among their aid recipients, and we have strong reasons to believe this is the case for many donors, then donors themselves may significantly dampen corruption by making their aid more transparent in the first place."*

Zachary Christensen et al., 2011

### Corruption and Development Aid – Confronting the Challenges

Georg Cremer, 2008

In this book, secretary general of Caritas Germany, Georg Cremer, explores the nature and impact of corruption in development aid. As the taboo against openly discussing this subject is only now being fully overcome, this analysis provides a useful insight into the topic and identifies the conditions under which corruption is most likely to take hold. It also provides practical advice and guidelines for aid organizations to help them limit the existing corruption risks.

[https://www.rienner.com/title/Corruption\\_and\\_Development\\_Aid\\_Confronting\\_the\\_Challenges](https://www.rienner.com/title/Corruption_and_Development_Aid_Confronting_the_Challenges)

### Transparency Squared: The Effects of Aid Transparency on Recipients' Corruption Levels

Zachary Christensen et al., 2011

In this article the authors evaluate the hypothesis that increased donor transparency leads to lower levels of corruption. They explore the relationship between aid transparency (quantified by the breadth of project information provided by donors) and levels of corruption in recipient countries and find that, on the aggregate, more transparent aid leads to lower levels of corruption in recipient countries. The authors point out the hopeful message from this line of research: donors can potentially make a significant contribution to reducing corruption by increasing aid transparency.

[https://ncgg.princeton.edu/IPES/2010/papers/F22\\_0\\_paper2.pdf](https://ncgg.princeton.edu/IPES/2010/papers/F22_0_paper2.pdf)

### Clientelism and Political Recruitment in Democratic Transition

Oleh Protsyk and Marius Lupsa Matichescu, 2011

In this article the authors identify legislative recruitment patterns as informational sources of clientelistic practices among political parties in new democracies. The authors create an original dataset using data on Romanian parliamentary representation to test their findings, which indicate the existence of considerable differences in legislative recruitment patterns in emerging and established democratic systems. By studying political recruitment patterns in relation to party relationships in resource-rich constituencies, the authors provide a potential model for cross-party and, possibly, cross-country analysis of differences of parties' interaction with candidates in different constituencies.

<http://www.policy.hu/protsyk/Publications/Articles/CPRomClient11.pdf>

### Corruption and Social Interaction: Evidence from China

Bin Dong and Benno Torgier, 2011

In this paper the authors theoretically and empirically explore whether social interaction, including local and global interaction, influences the incidence of corruption. They use an interaction-based model on corruption that predicts that the level of corruption is positively associated with social interaction. The authors then empirically verify the theoretical prediction using within-country evidence at the province-level in China during 1998 to 2007. The findings underscore the relevance of social interaction in understanding corruption.

[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1756843##](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1756843##)

## FIGHTING CORRUPTION

### Is Transparency an Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy?

Leonid Peisakhin and Paul Pinto, 2010

This paper suggests that India's recently adopted freedom of information law is almost as effective as bribery in helping the poor secure access to a basic public service. By monitoring the time it took for slum dwellers in Delhi to obtain a ration card using four different mechanisms: bribe paying, filling in a Right to Information Act request shortly after filing ration card applications, presenting letters of support from a local NGO alongside applications and using the standard prescribed procedure, the paper provides solid empirical evidence that regulatory reform can result in better service delivery to the poor.

[http://www.accountabilityindia.in/sites/default/files/document-library/regulationandgovernance\\_peisakhin.pdf](http://www.accountabilityindia.in/sites/default/files/document-library/regulationandgovernance_peisakhin.pdf)

### Exploring the Impact of Foreign Aid on Corruption: Has the "Anti-Corruption Movement" Been Effective?

Nicholas Charron, 2011

This unique study empirically assesses how the Anti-Corruption Movement (ACM) has impacted official development assistance (ODA) and consequently corruption levels of recipient countries. It makes a significant contribution in assessing the vastly complex effects of the ACM by theoretically distinguishing and empirically testing the impact of ODA on corruption by disentangling its effects over time and by donor type.

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1746-1049.2010.00122.x/pdf>

## ANTI-CORRUPTION RESEARCH NEWS

### HIGHLIGHTS IN ANTI-CORRUPTION RESEARCH

#### Democracy, Governance, and Randomized Development Assistance

Devra C. Moehler, 2010

Can field experiments be productively employed to study the impact of development assistance on democracy and governance outcomes? A small but growing number of practitioners and scholars are inventing a new research domain at the intersection of evaluation and political science. The article reviews recent and ongoing democracy and governance field experiments, and it offers lessons about the prospects and obstacles to the future development of a useful body of experimental evidence on the political economy of development.

<http://ann.sagepub.com/content/628/1/30.abstract>

#### Anti-corruption for Eastern Europe

Schmidt-Pfister and Holger Moroff (eds.), 2010

This special issue of *Global Crime* brings together international, national and domestic perspectives of anti-corruption strategies in Eastern Europe. The articles suggest that coincidental and spontaneous breakthroughs are currently outweighing the systematic implementation of appropriate anti-corruption strategies. The findings also reinforce the need for societal support for successful implementation of anti-corruption reforms.

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=g921569201>



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### FEATURED CURRICULUM

#### TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND CORRUPTION

##### George Mason University – Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre

Developed by Professor Louise Shelley, this course provides an overview of transnational crime and corruption and its effects on the political, economic, and social development of countries around the world. The growing problem of transnational crime in conflict regions is a central focus. The increasing links among crime groups, corruption and terrorism and the diverse range of activities in both the legitimate and illegitimate economy are also addressed. The diverse dimensions of transnational crime and corruption are examined from the perspective of American specialists, as well as those in other parts of the world.

Some sample modules and examples of recommended readings include:

##### Conceptualising the problem

This module focuses on how transnational crime often has deep historical roots within many societies that are overlooked in many current analyses of the recent rise of the phenomena.

- L. Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation State?," *Journal of International Affairs*, 45(2): 463-489, 1995
- K. Thachuk, *Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs and Human Life* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), Introduction, pp. 3-20
- S. Strange, "Organized Crime: the Mafias," in *Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 110-121

#### Facilitating transnational crime and corruption

This module examines the hypothesis that transnational crime is able to function because there has been a decline of borders and a rise of ease of communications through the internet and other advanced communication channels.

- R. Koslowski, "The Mobility Money Can Buy: Human Smuggling and Border Control in the European Union," in P. Andreas and T. Snyder (eds.), *The Wall Around the West State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe* (Maryland: Lowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp.203-218
- M. Glenny, *McMafia: A Journey Through the Criminal Underworld* (New York: Knopf, 2008), pp. 264-274 (on cybercrime)

#### Combating Transnational Organized Crime and Corruption

This module seeks to answer questions such as: Why do the means necessary to combat corruption and organized crime extend beyond legal prohibitions and prosecutions? What do the problems in combating drugs and human trafficking reveal about the larger problems of transnational crime?

- M. Berdal and D. Malone, *Greed and Grievance Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 173-88 and pp. 203-32
- J. R. Wagley, "Transnational Organized Crime: Principal Threats and U.S. Responses," Congressional Research Service, March 2006
- D. Giovanini, "Taking Animal Trafficking Out of the Shadows, Renctas Uses the Internet to Combat a Multi-Billion Dollar Trade," *Innovations*, 1(2): 119-39, 2008

*Are you currently teaching or developing a course on corruption? Share your ideas and help corruption curriculum development in academic institutions around the world by featuring it on the ACRN website and newsletter.*

*Please write to us:*  
[acrn\\_editor@transparency.org](mailto:acrn_editor@transparency.org)

## RESEARCH PROJECTS &amp; MARKETPLACE

*If you would like us to feature a current or planned project on corruption or governance research then please let us know.*

*To advertise corruption research jobs, events, courses and funding opportunities on ACRN's online platform and newsletter please write to us or visit our website:*

[www.corruptionresearchnet.work.org](http://www.corruptionresearchnet.work.org)

## RESEARCH PROJECTS

**Mapping Corruption Assessment Tools**

Transparency International

Transparency International's GATEway project is in the process of mapping the corruption assessment tools currently being used in the field. Focusing on the relatively lesser known 'actionable' tools which can be used at the local level for specific sectors and institutions, rather than high profile global indices and studies, the project will provide practitioners with practical guidance on the respective strengths and weaknesses of the existing approaches, and their most appropriate applications. At a later stage, GATEway will reveal gaps in the corruption assessment landscape and support the development of new tools where they are most needed. Should you have a tool to share, please email [gateway@transparency.org](mailto:gateway@transparency.org).  
<http://www.transparency.org/tools/gateway>

**Accountability and prevention of corruption**

UN DESA

The Division for Public Administration and Development Management (DPADM) in the UN's Economic and Social Affairs Department is producing a publication on innovative practices for governments to enhance accountability (including social accountability). The publication will also address how improved accountability helps prevent corruption. To prepare the publication DPADM will carry out several meetings, some in cooperation with UNODC. A meeting of experts and practitioners on accountability and prevention of corruption will also be organized back-to-back with the Fourth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption in Morocco in October 2011.

<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/newsletter/2011/february/capacity.shtml>

**Assessing corruption vulnerabilities in the 50 US states**

Global Integrity

As part of their Local Integrity Initiative, Global Integrity has announced a major 18-month project in the US to assess corruption risks across the public sector in all 50 states. Using their 'Integrity Indicators', the project will work with statehouse reporters to gather data, before developing a ranking of the results. A follow on project will aim to enhance the citizen monitoring capacity of

local civil society using techniques developed in the global South (rarely applied in the US), and provide support for concrete reform within state governments.  
<http://local.globalintegrity.org/>

## RESEARCH MARKETPLACE

**Jobs and Consultancies**

- **ODI's Research and Policy in Development (RAPID)** programme is seeking a Research Fellow to develop an important stream of work on cost effective and widely replicable approaches to evaluation and impact assessment including qualitative, quantitative, mixed and participatory methods.  
<http://www.odi.org.uk/about/jobs/details.asp?id=388&title=research-fellow-evaluation-impact-assessment>
- **The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)** is seeking a Research Coordinator (P4) to contribute to intellectual leadership and enhance research capacity in the area of social policy and development. Under the general supervision of the Director of UNRISD the incumbent will be responsible for conceptualising and managing a programme of research within the current priority area of the Institute on 'Social Policy for Inclusive Development'.  
<http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BF3C2/search/56FC7EF8E6C06E8BC1257865002A276F?OpenDocument&cntxt=03743&cookielang=en#top>
- **Internship: The Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA)** is an international centre for learning and promotion of participation and democratic governance. Its Internship Programme known as the PRIA International Internship Programme (PIIP) is of 8 weeks duration and usually held by August/September every year. The internship aims to provide students from across the world an opportunity to come together and learn about development realities of India. The interns will be provided the experience to launch their careers with practical insights and perspectives needed to become effective change agents.  
<http://www.priaeducation.org/piip.php>

## ANTI-CORRUPTION RESEARCH NEWS

### RESEARCH MARKETPLACE

#### Funding Opportunities

- The **“la Caixa” savings bank Foundation and the Barcelona GSE** are offering 14 fully-funded scholarships to students from emerging and developing countries with excellent academic backgrounds who will return to their home countries at the end of their professional training process to implement their knowledge.  
[http://www.barcelonagse.eu/Scholarship\\_Sponsors.html](http://www.barcelonagse.eu/Scholarship_Sponsors.html)
- The **Central European University** is seeking a two-year political networks post-doc. In addition to academic research the candidate will be responsible for setting up a website/blog that targets non-academic audience, on issues such as political corruption.  
<http://www.jobs.ac.uk/job/ACN014/post-doctoral-fellowship/>

#### Call for papers

- In collaboration with Millennium Capital L.P. and Rutgers Business School the **International Journal of Disclosure and Governance** will publish a special issue on Financial Crises and Regulatory Responses. This publication, planned for late 2011, is the journal's fourth special issue. Papers can focus on the 2007-09 crisis and the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US, or have a broader focus.  
<http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jdg/index.html>

#### Upcoming Events

- **Democracy, Governance and Development: Between the Institutional and the Political?**  
 27 - 28 June, University of Oxford, UK  
 The Oxford Department of International Development and St Antony's College will be holding a conference aimed to bring together high-quality academic research on the ways in which popular political processes interact with discourses, policies and practices of development.  
[http://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/pdf-misc/CFP\\_Dem\\_Gov\\_Dev.pdf](http://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/pdf-misc/CFP_Dem_Gov_Dev.pdf)

- **E-Government Conference 2011**  
 28 August - 02 September, Delft, The Netherlands  
 This conference brings together the top research community in e-government from all over the world. The conference provides a highly interactive and professional forum for exchanging research concepts, progress and results. In recent years, the assessment and evaluation of e-government projects, citizens at the center, adoption and diffusion, and the role of information and communication technology for development rank among leading topics on the research agenda.  
<http://www.egov-conference.org/egov-2011>

#### Training and Courses

- **International Anti-Corruption Summer Academy**  
 30 June - 09 July, Laxenburg, Austria  
 The International Anti-Corruption Summer Academy (IACSA) is organized by the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA). Under the title “Practice Meets Science”, it provides an international, interdisciplinary, intersectoral and holistic approach to the corruption phenomenon. During the ten-day course, participants will develop an understanding of the legal, economic, criminological, sociological, psychological and cultural issues of corruption in a globalized world.  
[http://www.iaca-info.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=101&Itemid=115](http://www.iaca-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=101&Itemid=115)
- **Executive Course in Communication and Governance Reform**  
 18 - 27 July, Washington DC, USA  
 This course is designed for communication professionals in Africa and the Middle East who want to build critical competencies in providing implementation support to change agents and reform leaders throughout government and civil society. It's being piloted by the World Bank along with the Annenberg School for Communication.  
<http://go.worldbank.org/F3AE60PXY0>



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